Understanding the Whistle-blowing Intention to Report Breach of Confidentiality by Li, Wanyun et al.
Communications of the Association for Information Systems 
Volume 47 Article 4 
10-11-2020 
Understanding the Whistle-blowing Intention to Report Breach of 
Confidentiality 
Wanyun Li 
The Australian National University, wanyun.li@anu.edu.au 
Ka Wai (Stanley) Choi 
The Australian National University, stanley.choi@anu.edu.au 
Shuk Ying Ho 
Australian National University, susanna.ho@anu.edu.au 
Follow this and additional works at: https://aisel.aisnet.org/cais 
Recommended Citation 
Li, W., Choi, K., & Ho, S. (2020). Understanding the Whistle-blowing Intention to Report Breach of 
Confidentiality. Communications of the Association for Information Systems, 47, pp-pp. https://doi.org/
10.17705/1CAIS.04704 
This material is brought to you by the AIS Journals at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Communications of the Association for Information Systems by an authorized administrator of AIS 
Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact elibrary@aisnet.org. 
 
C 
 
ommunications of the 
A 
 
I 
 
S 
 
 ssociation for nformation ystems 
    
 
Research Paper DOI: 10.17705/1CAIS.04704 ISSN: 1529-3181 
Volume 47  Paper 4   pp. 72 – 94  September 2020 
 
 
Understanding the Whistle-blowing Intention to 
Report Breach of Confidentiality 
 
Wanyun Li 
Research School of Accounting  
The Australian National University  
wanyun.li@anu.edu.au 
 
Ka Wai (Stanley) Choi 
Research School of Accounting  
The Australian National University 
 Shuk Ying Ho 
Research School of Accounting  
The Australian National University 
 
 
Abstract: 
We examine the factors that encourage employees to whistle-blow wrongdoings in relation to confidentiality breaches. 
We investigate how their anticipated regret about remaining silent changes over time, how such changes influence 
their whistle-blowing intentions, and what employee characteristics and organizational policies moderate this 
relationship. Drawing on attribution theory, we develop three hypotheses. Our experiment findings show that: 1) 
employees’ perceptions of the controllability and intentionality (but not stability) of the wrongdoing act affect how their 
anticipated regret evolves, 2) anticipated regret increases employees’ whistle-blowing intentions, 3) anticipated regret 
has a stronger effect on whistle-blowing intentions when organizations implement policies that promote efforts to 
protect information confidentiality, and 4) employees with information technology knowledge have a stronger intention 
to whistle-blow. Theoretically, our study extends the organization security literature’s focus to individuals’ whistle-
blowing and highlights an IS research agenda around whistle-blowing in relation to confidentiality breaches. 
Practically, it informs organizations about how to encourage employees to whistle-blow when they observe 
confidentiality breaches. 
Keywords: Whistle-blowing, Attribution Theory, Organizational Policy, Confidentiality Breach. 
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1 Introduction 
Digital information about individuals that organizations store has become increasingly complete and 
traceable, which has led to concerns about confidentiality breaches. Consequently, information systems 
(IS) researchers have invested substantial effort in increasing IS security to ensure the confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of data that organizations hold in their systems (Boss, Galletta, Lowry, Moody, & 
Polak, 2015; Lowry, Moody, Galletta, & Vance, 2013; Posey, Roberts, & Lowry, 2015). Despite this effort, 
organizations may still experience security vulnerabilities, such as employees’ inadvertently disclosing 
personal information and third parties’ mishandling personal data (Debatin, Lovejoy, Horn, & Hughes, 
2009; lachello & Hong, 2007). Such vulnerabilities involve human beings, which means employees may 
learn about or notice such wrongdoings and potentially whistle-blow on them. In this paper, we examine 
the factors that lead employees to whistle-blow wrongdoings in relation to confidentiality breaches. 
Whistle-blowing refers to an organization’s former or current members’ disclosing illegal, immoral, or 
illegitimate practices to persons or organizations that may be able to effect action (Near & Miceli, 1985). In 
general, researchers consider whistle-blowing an effective mechanism to uncover threats to public safety 
(Hwang, Staley, Te Chen, & Lan, 2008; Kaptein, 2011; Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005; Taylor & 
Curtis, 2010; Vandekerckhove, 2018). However, thus far, researchers have examined whistle-blowing in 
relation to financial fraud. Even though IS researchers consider user information an asset as valuable as 
financial information (Posey, Roberts, Lowry, Bennett, & Courtney, 2013; Posey et al., 2015) and expect 
people to whistle-blow confidentiality breaches (Guo & Yu, 2019; Mamonov, Koufaris, & Benbunan-Fich, 
2017; Padayachee, 2016; Posey et al., 2015; Tim, Pan, Bahri, & Fauzi, 2017; van Offenbeek, Boonstra, & 
Seo, 2017; Zhang & Leidner, 2018), they have not yet tested whether whistle-blowing applies to 
confidentiality breaches. We do not know whether whistle-blowing applies to confidentiality breaches 
because these breaches result in less obvious damage to organizations and even to victims; as such, 
employees may not consider reporting it necessary. To investigate this issue, we examine situational 
factors that that lead employees to whistle-blow wrongdoings related to confidentiality breaches. 
Accordingly, we propose our first research question (RQ): 
RQ1: What factors motivate employees to whistle-blow when encountering wrongdoings related to 
confidentiality breaches? 
Although whistle-blowing reinforces a “speak-up” culture to protect employees and the public (Ciasullo, 
Cosimato, & Palumbo, 2017; Morrison & Milliken, 2000), employees often have psychological resistance 
to it. Specifically, whistle-blowers struggle between loyalty to their employer and a moral commitment to 
the law and society at large. Also, they often receive no support to protect them from retaliation (Buckley, 
Cotter, Hutchinson, & O’Leary, 2010; Kaplan & Schultz, 2007; Keil, Tiwana, Sainsbury, & Sneha, 2010; 
Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005; Vandekerckhove, 2018). Whistle-blowing retaliation examples 
include demotion, social isolation, character assassination, and job loss (Keil et al., 2010; Mesmer-
Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005; Rehg, Miceli, Near, & Van Scotter, 2008; Vandekerckhove, 2018). As a 
result, whistle-blowers face a psychological battle in deciding whether to report a breach, but some 
experience anticipated regret about remaining silent. Regret refers to the emotion that decision makers 
feel when looking back at choices that went awry (Zeelenberg, Van Dijk, Manstead, & vanr de Pligt, 2000). 
But decision makers can also anticipate regret beforehand and consider it when evaluating different 
options as to avoid regret happening in the future (Fredin, 2011; Keil, Park, & Ramesh 2018). 
Investigating confidentiality breaches involves more complexity than investigating financial fraud because, 
unlike financial fraud, one cannot always accurately determine how much they cost their victims. 
Therefore, we argue that repeated confidentiality breaches will likely reduce employees’ anticipated regret 
and increase their whistle-blowing intentions. Drawing on attribution theory, we identify three fraud-
occurrence attributes (stability, controllability, and intentionality) and examine how they influence a 
potential whistle-blower’s anticipated regret. Keil et al. (2018) examined potential whistle-blowers’ 
anticipated regret with a cross-sectional view. Adding to Keil et al. (2018), we examine how their 
anticipated regret evolves. Accordingly, we propose: 
RQ2: When potential whistle-blowers have encountered multiple confidentiality breaches by their 
colleagues, how does their anticipated regret evolve over time? 
Wrongdoings that concern confidentiality breaches can damage organizational reputation and place 
organizations under the risk of litigation (Ambrose & Gelb, 2001). IS researchers have examined the 
adverse impact that confidentiality breaches can have (e.g., Renaud, 2012; Smith, Dinev & Xu, 2011), 
such as negative public reactions to confidentiality breach announcements (e.g., Campbell, Gordon, Loeb 
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& Zhou; Kannan, Rees & Sridhar, 2007). Some IS researchers have proposed IS security measures 
(Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, & Benbasat, 2010; Kankanhalli, Teo, Tan, & Wei, 2003; Siponen & Vance, 2010). 
However, few researchers have mentioned “whistle-blowing” specifically. As an exception, Lowry et al. 
(2013) proposed an online whistle-blowing reporting system in the workplace and identified key design 
features to promote whistle-blowing behaviors. In practice, however, many companies do not have the 
resources to establish an online whistle-blowing reporting system. Adding to prior research, we propose 
that organizations adopt whistle-blowing policies that urge potential whistle-blowers to voice their 
concerns when they detect wrongdoings. Implementing whistle-blowing policies presents a lower entry 
barrier to most companies than setting up an online whistle-blowing reporting system. Typical 
organizational practices include supervisor support (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005; Sims & 
Keenan, 1998), an ethical culture (Kaptein, 2011), an anonymous reporting channel (Kaplan & Schultz, 
2007), and formal and informal whistle-blowing policies (Sims & Keenan, 1998). Research has found 
these organizational policies to effectively encourage whistle-blowing; however, such research has 
focused on only financial fraud. People may perceive confidentiality breaches to cause little damage, and 
thus, the aforementioned organizational policies may be less effective. In addition, individuals with limited 
technical knowledge can have difficulty understanding user information data mining and may be less likely 
to report confidentiality breaches. Accordingly, we propose: 
RQ3: How do organizational policies and a potential whistle-blower’s information technology (IT) 
knowledge promote whistle-blowing intentions? 
We draw on attribution theory to develop three hypotheses. The hypotheses examine the relationship 
between the longitudinal change in anticipated regret and its subsequent effect on intention to whistle-
blow. They also examine whether an employee’s IT knowledge and the presence of organizational 
policies moderate the effect that anticipated regret has on whistle-blowing intentions. We conducted an 
online scenario-based experiment with 473 subjects who we tasked with reporting how they perceived 
wrongdoings related to confidentiality breaches in healthcare organizations. We ran a latent growth model 
(LGM) to analyze the data. 
This paper proceeds as follows: in Section 2, we review the literature. In Section 3, we present attribution 
theory and develop the hypotheses. In Section 4, we present the experiment design. In Sections 5 and 6, 
we present and discuss our findings, respectively. Finally, in Section 7, we conclude the paper. 
2 Background and Literature Review 
In our study, confidentiality breaches involve personal information, such as an individual’s health records, 
financial records, criminal records, political records, transaction records, business-related information, and 
Internet behavior (Hann, Hui, Lee, & Png, 2007; Langenderfer & Cook, 2004). Confidentiality breaches 
have drawn critical attention from the public partially due to the growing expectation that organizations will 
protect consumers’ privacy. As the quantity of collected personal information continues to grow, people 
wish to maintain their anonymity and confidentiality (Debatin et al., 2009). Unfortunately, record 
digitization has increased the ease and speed with which organizations can share data with third parties 
and with which individuals can easily breach confidentiality. To detect confidentiality breaches, 
organizations in recent scandals on the Internet have relied on employees’ whistle-blowing. 
Whistle-blowing comprises six elements: 1) the disclosure of damaging news, 2) a whistle-blower agent, 
3) a disclosure subject; 4) a target organization held responsible, 5) a disclosure recipient, and 6) a 
disclosure outcome (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005). Whistle-blowing can be internal or external 
depending on the disclosure recipient (Kaptein, 2011). Internal whistle-blowing involves reporting 
wrongdoings to a person outside the regular chain of command but in the organization, while external 
whistle-blowing involves reporting wrongdoings to an entity outside the organization, such as the media or 
a government agency, because the entity can stop or correct the wrongdoing. Among these two types of 
whistle-blowing, external whistle-blowing leads to severe consequences for the target organization held 
responsible such as public embarrassment, government scrutiny, hefty fines, or even litigation risks 
(Kaptein, 2011). 
Although confidentiality breaches represent an important research topic, few studies have investigated 
whistle-blowing in relation to them. We reviewed papers published between 2009 and 2018 that 
concerned whistle-blowing (not specific to confidentiality breaches). We collected publications from six 
major IS journals: MIS Quarterly, Information Systems Research, Journal of Management Information 
Systems, Journal of the Association for Information Systems, European Journal of Information Systems, 
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and Information Systems Journal. We included three additional journals—Decision Support Systems, 
Information and Management, and Communications of the Association for Information Systems—because 
these journals publish papers on new and advanced developments in the IS discipline. Table 1 
summarizes the literature we found. 
Table 1. Publications that Mention “Whistle-Blowing” 
Authors Research objectives Method Findings and significance Remarks 
Guo & Yu 
(2019) 
The authors examined the 
seemingly antithetical tension 
between discipline and 
anonymity in online settings. 
They highlighted how IT both 
enables and constrains how 
individuals balance the 
competing needs of anonymity 
and discipline.  
Textual analysis 
on accountants’ 
postings on an 
online forum. 
The authors found that the 
online forum is an omniopticon 
in which the anonymous 
online self is disciplined and 
monitored in many ways. 
Information technology both 
enables and constrains how 
individuals balance the 
competing needs of anonymity 
and discipline. 
While the authors 
did not focus on 
whistle-blowing, 
they mentioned 
that anonymity 
reduces 
psychological costs 
and can promote 
activities such as 
whistle‐blowing. 
Keil et al. 
(2018) 
The authors focused on 
individuals’ whistle‐blowing 
intentions. In particular, the 
authors looked at health 
information privacy violations. 
They examined the role of 
attributions, the seriousness of 
wrongdoing, and emotion in 
shaping individuals' 
whistle‐blowing intentions in the 
context of health information 
privacy violations. 
Experiments of 
hypothetical 
scenarios to 
collect data. 
The authors found that the 
seriousness of wrongdoing 
and people’s emotion affect 
their whistle‐blowing 
intentions. 
Authors used 
whistle-blowing 
intention as a 
dependent 
variable. 
Lee, Keil, 
Smith, & 
Sarkar 
(2017) 
The authors focused on 
individuals’ decision to report 
errors on IT projects. 
Specifically, they investigated the 
effects of mood (i.e., positive vs. 
negative) and a personality trait 
(conscientiousness) on error 
reporting decision.  
A scenario‐based 
laboratory 
experiment. 
An individual’s affective states 
and conscientiousness 
influence the individual’s error 
reporting decisions. Further, 
mood moderates the 
relationship between 
conscientiousness and 
willingness to report. 
Authors used 
intention to report 
errors as a 
dependent 
variable. 
Lowry et al. 
(2013) 
Whistle-blowing has long been a 
critical phenomenon that 
potentially places the firm and 
the whistle-blower at great risk. 
The paper explores the use of 
online whistle-blowing reporting 
systems in the workplace. The 
authors argue that anonymity, 
trust, and risk of online systems 
alter system usage. The authors 
propose a model specific to a 
whistle-blowing reporting system 
and examine the willingness to 
whistle-blow via the system, with 
the addition of trust, risk, and the 
multidimensional construct of 
anonymity.  
An online 
experiment of 
hypothetical 
scenarios with 
working 
professionals. 
The authors found that 
perceived risk of 
organizational failures and 
personal risk influence 
whistle-blowing behavior. The 
authors indicated that these 
nuanced conceptualizations 
and measures contribute 
important knowledge on 
whistle-blowing to both 
research and practice. 
 
The authors used 
willingness to 
whistle-blowing as 
a dependent 
variable of the 
paper.  
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Table 1. Publications that Mention “Whistle-Blowing” 
Mamonov et 
al. (2017) 
Social networks leverage crowd-
sourced information assets as 
essential pillars supporting their 
business models. However, the 
appropriation of rights to 
information assets through legal 
contracts often fails to prevent 
conflicts between the users and 
the companies that claim 
information rights. This paper 
examines why those conflicts 
arise and what their 
consequences are. The authors 
propose that intellectual property 
and privacy expectancies 
comprise core domains of 
psychological contracts between 
social networks and their users, 
and perceived breaches of those 
expectancies trigger a 
psychological contract violation. 
They use the exit, voice, loyalty, 
and neglect typology to define 
the user behavioral outcomes.  
A cross-sectional 
survey of 
Facebook users 
to collect data 
and test 
hypotheses. 
The authors found that 
perceived breaches to privacy 
and intellectual property rights 
generate the affective 
experience of a psychological 
contract violation, which is 
strongly associated with exit 
intentions. 
The authors did not 
focus on whistle-
blowing. However, 
they mentioned 
that the perceived 
breaches of 
privacy and 
intellectual 
property rights can 
possibly cause 
“voice” (of which 
whistle-blowing is 
an example). 
Padayachee 
(2016) 
The author focused on 
evaluating information security 
measures. To do so, the author 
drew on opportunity theories 
from the criminology discipline. 
The author evaluated extant 
opportunity-reducing techniques 
that organizations have 
employed to mitigate insider 
threats. 
A three-round 
Delphi process 
with 23 experts 
from the industry. 
The author conceptualized the 
element of opportunity in 
terms of the insider threat 
problem. Organizations can 
use this conceptualization to 
implement information security 
controls that should empower 
information security 
administrators to prevent and 
possibly counteract insider 
threats.  
 
While the author 
did not focus on 
whistle-blowing, 
the author 
mentioned 
applicable 
techniques to 
overcome the 
insider threat 
problem and the 
increase in effort 
will likely promote 
whistle-blowing. 
Posey et al. 
(2015) 
The authors examined the role of 
organizational commitment in 
organization information security. 
Organizational commitment is a 
mechanism through which 
organizational security threats 
become personally relevant to 
insiders and how security 
education, training, and 
awareness efforts promote 
protective security behaviors.  
A survey panel 
with insiders that 
a panel provider 
requisitioned. 
The authors found that 
security education, training, 
and awareness efforts help 
insiders form appraisals. Also, 
they found that protection 
motivation theory also applies 
to organizational rather than 
personal contexts but that its 
applicability depends on 
insiders’ organizational 
commitment levels. Through 
organizational commitment, 
organizational security threats 
become personally relevant to 
insiders and security 
education, training, and 
awareness efforts influence 
many components based on 
protection motivation. 
While the authors 
did not focus on 
whistle-blowing, 
they mentioned 
whistle-blowing in 
the paper’s 
practical 
implication section. 
They proposed 
strategies for 
avoiding retaliation 
and encouraging 
whistle-blowing. 
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Table 1. Publications that Mention “Whistle-Blowing” 
Tim et al. 
(2017) 
Digital technology is increasingly 
being recognized as a catalyst 
for national progress and social 
transformation. This paper 
explores the use of social media 
in bringing societal change 
through civic engagement. 
Taking a case study approach, 
the authors conceptualize how 
social media could be enacted to 
serve different boundary 
spanning purposes toward 
facilitating civic involvement. 
An in-depth case 
study of social 
media-enabled 
crime-fighting 
communities in 
Malaysia. 
Online users consider social 
media an important channel 
for whistle-blowing. 
While the authors 
did not focus on 
whistle-blowing, 
but they mentioned 
it as a key role of 
social media to 
amplify citizen 
interest. 
van 
Offenbeek 
et al. (2017) 
The authors integrated two 
perspectives of technology 
adoption research: acceptance 
and resistance. They identified 
factors that lead to system 
acceptance and factors that lead 
to system avoidance.  
Semi-structured 
telephone 
interviews from 
both urban and 
rural areas to 
capture users’ 
intentions 
regarding system 
adoption. 
The authors identified 
ambivalent reactions. In their 
sample, they found many 
users that support but do not 
use technology and others 
that resist but use technology. 
Their findings support the view 
that non-acceptance and 
resistance conceptually differ. 
While the authors 
did not focus on 
whistle-blowing, 
they mentioned 
that whistle-
blowing is an 
example of system 
resistance. 
Zhang & 
Leidner 
(2018) 
The authors focused on 
workplace cyberbullying. They 
examined how workplace 
cyberbullies justify their bullying 
behaviors and how cyber-
communication features 
influence workplace 
cyberbullying behaviors.  
A survey with 
employees 
across various 
job positions, 
companies, and 
industries to 
collect data and 
test hypotheses. 
The authors found three 
denial-neutralization 
techniques (i.e., denial of 
injury, denial of responsibility, 
and denial of victim) that 
perpetrators use to justify their 
workplace cyberbullying 
behaviors and demonstrated 
the moderating effects of 
cyber communication 
features.  
 
While the authors 
did not focus on 
whistle-blowing, 
they used the 
theory of 
neutralization and 
mentioned that 
neutralization 
exerts an effect on 
individuals’ whistle-
blowing intentions. 
According to Table 1, IS researchers consider “whistle-blowing” a valid approach to address information 
security problems, but they have not focused on “whistle-blowing” specifically in their papers. Needless to 
say, we found even fewer papers that have examined employees’ whistle-blowing specific to 
confidentiality breaches. We identified two exceptions: Keil et al. (2018) and Ciasullo et al. (2017). Keil et 
al. (2018) examined how confidentiality breach attributions influence employees’ emotions in shaping their 
intention to whistle-blow to external parties. They examined how the intentionality and seriousness of 
health information privacy violations influence employees’ anticipated regret about remaining silent and, 
subsequently, influence their willingness to report. Ciasullo et al. (2017) focused on organizational barriers 
and suggested that whistle-blowing requires an ethical culture and available anonymous reporting 
channels in an organization in relation to confidentiality breaches. 
Based on the review we present above, we integrate Keil et al.’s (2018) psychological perspective and 
Ciasullo et al.’s (2017) management perspective to examine how employees’ anticipated regret about not 
whistle-blowing changes over time. Inspired by recent scandals on the Internet, we consider whistle-
blowers as employees in an organization. In March, 2018, attackers leaked more than 50 million 
Facebook user profiles to controversial political data analytics provider Cambridge Analytica, which might 
have helped Donald Trump win the 2016 presidential campaign. Facebook reviewed whether one of its 
own research employees knew about the leak. In March, 2011, HealthNet announced a confidentiality 
breach that affected two million of its insurance customers, which exposed their names, addresses, social 
security numbers, and health and financial data. The data, which lacked any encryption, resided in hard 
drives that the company found missing from the data center of its contractor, IBM. Individual employees 
caused these scandals, and outsiders or even management did not detect them. Therefore, protecting 
information confidentiality depends on employees’ whistle-blowing. 
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3 Theory and Hypotheses Development 
3.1 Attribution Theory 
Attribution theory, a cognitive psychology theory, states that people attempt to understand others’ 
behavior by attributing feelings, beliefs, and intentions to them. Individuals go through three steps to form 
an attribution (Griffin, 1991; Weiner, 1972): 1) observe an individual’s behavior; 2) interpret the individual’s 
behavior, attribute possible causes for it, and form emotional reactions according to those attributions; and 
3) judge the individual. We apply this three-step process to whistle-blowing as follows: an employee 
observes an act of wrongdoing and assesses the wrongdoer’s situation and then attributes observed 
misbehavior’s possible causes to the wrongdoer to form an emotional reaction. These reactions 
subsequently affect the employee’s intention to whistle-blow (Gundlach, Douglas, & Martinko, 2003).  
The second stage deserves more attention because the way people interpret wrongdoing behavior’s 
possible causes ultimately influences their whistle-blowing intention in regard to wrongdoers. Thus, we 
elaborate on the second step further. People interpret a behavior to attribute possible causes to the 
behavior. This attribution has three dimensions: locus of causality, stability, and controllability (Weiner, 
1986). Locus of causality refers to the extent to which a behavior’s cause originates internally or externally 
from the person (Harvey, Martinko, & Borkowski, 2017; Iglesias, Varela-Neira, & Vázquez-Casielles, 2015; 
Varela-Neira, Vázquez-Casielles, & Iglesias, 2014). With an internal locus of causality, actors can 
influence events and their behavior. In contrast, with an external locus of causality, situational forces drive 
actors’ behaviors. Stability refers to the extent to which the observed behavior’s causes remain 
unchanged over time. The causes can be permanent or transitory (Harvey et al., 2017; Keil et al., 2018; 
Thompson & O’Sullivan, 2017). Controllability refers to the extent to which one can manage a behavior’s 
cause (Harvey et al., 2017; Iglesias et al., 2015; Thompson & O’Sullivan, 2017). With high controllability, 
people believe that they can avoid the wrongdoing if the wrongdoer behaves properly. In contrast, with low 
controllability, people do not accuse the wrongdoer of negligence but place blame on circumstances 
beyond the wrongdoer’s control. In addition to the three dimensions that Weiner (1986) has identified, 
recent studies included one more dimension—intentionality (Harvey et al., 2017; Iglesias et al., 2015; 
Thompson & O’Sullivan, 2017). Intentionality refers to the extent to which people attribute a behavior’s 
cause to purposive actions. People can commit wrongdoings purposefully or unintentionally. 
In this study, we focus on stability, controllability, and intentionality. We do not consider locus of causality 
because, in the whistle-blowing context, an employee constitutes the individual who unethically uses 
personal information, and the typical external causality in the workplace—management’s pressure on this 
employee—falls outside our research problem’s scope because we examine data that an employee leaks 
without management’s awareness. 
3.2 Hypotheses Development 
Drawing on attribution theory, we examine the effect that employees’ psychological and organizational 
factors have on how employees’ anticipated regret about not whistle-blowing changes over time and how 
organizational policies and employees’ IT knowledge moderate the relationship between anticipated regret 
and intentions to whistle-blow. We present our research model in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Research Model 
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3.2.1 Effect that Stability, Controllability, and Intentionality have on How Anticipated 
Regret about Remaining Silent Changes over Time 
Drawing on attribution theory, we argue that, when employees discover a colleague engaging in 
confidentiality breach activities, they try to understand why the colleague performed this act and attribute 
the colleague’s feelings, beliefs, and intentions to the organization (Griffin, 1991; Weiner, 1972). Prior 
studies have confirmed that the stability, controllability, and intentionality of the act that a wrongdoer 
performs elicit individuals to judge the wrongdoer’s responsibility (Gundlach, Martinko, & Douglas, 2008; 
Harvey et al., 2017; Orsingher, Hogreve, & Ordanini, 2016). Specifically, when an employee finds a 
colleague who conducts the same wrongdoings for the same reasons (stability), to not volitionally alter 
wrongdoings even when they can (controllability) or to intentionally engage in wrongdoings (intentionality), 
then the employee will perceive the colleagues as responsible for their wrongdoings. Observers form 
moral emotions and guilt if they realize the present situation would have improved if they had made a 
choice other than remaining silent (Keil et al., 2018; King, 2001; Sandberg, Hutter, Richetin, & Conner, 
2016). As a result, they anticipate regret. Prior studies have empirically proved the direct effect that 
perceived stability, controllability, and intentionality of a wrongdoing act have on regret (such as Sander & 
Scherer, 2009; Harrison-Walker, 2012). Adding to these studies, we examine how the three attributions 
(stability, controllability, and intentionality) affect how anticipated regret changes over time. 
Interestingly, the intensity of anticipated regret changes over time. In other words, an interplay between 
inaction and time exists (Gilovich & Medvec, 1995; Itzkin, Van Dijk, & Azar, 2016; Towers, Williams, Hill, 
Philipp, & Flett, 2016). An employee’s decision not to whistle-blow exemplifies inaction. In the following, 
we elaborate why anticipated regret grows in intensity with perceptions of wrongdoings’ stability, 
controllability, and intentionality. 
First, regret about inaction naturally grows over time (Gilovich & Medvec, 1995; Itzkin et al., 2016; Towers 
et al., 2016). When people decide not to act, they can have an inability to conquer their fears or 
hesitations when the “moment of truth” arrives (Abraham & Sheeran, 2003; Fredin, 2011; Keil et al., 
2018). Employees choose not to inform their supervisors about a possible fraudulent act by a colleague 
because they lack certainty about the outcome.  Employees strongly experience these negative emotions 
when making a decision, which can subsequently result in their inaction (Lerner, Li, Valdesolo, & Kassam, 
2015); however, after these emotions fade, people begin to consider their inaction’s consequences. A 
major reason why people anticipate regret about their inaction involves the possible good outcomes that 
would have arisen if they acted. Some people may even exaggerate the possible positive outcomes of 
acting (Gilovich & Medvec, 1995; Itzkin et al., 2016; Towers et al., 2016). As a result, their anticipated 
regret can magnify over time. 
Second, when people collect more evidence that contradicts their decision to not act, their anticipated 
regret builds further. In our context, the more frequently employees observe a wrongdoing, the more 
confident they become in how they judge its stability, controllability, and intentionality. Wrongdoings that 
continue to occur do so because an employee did not take action in the past and act as a reminder to 
urge the employee to recall the inaction (Abraham & Sheeran, 2003; Miceli & Near, 2002; Rajagopal, 
Raju, & Unnava, 2006). When an employee views a colleague repeatedly commit a wrongdoing related to 
confidentiality breaches, the employee attributes a higher degree of 1) stability, 2) controllability, and 3) 
intentionality to the wrongdoing act, which causes the employee’s anticipated regret to increase over time. 
Taken together, we predict that, when an employee observes a colleague commit wrongdoings more 
frequently, the employee anticipates more regret from remaining silent. Thus, we hypothesize: 
H1: When an employee views a colleague repeatedly commit a wrongdoing related to 
confidentiality breaches, the employee’s perceptions about its a) stability, b) controllability, 
and c) intentionality cause the employee’s anticipated regret to increase over time 
3.2.2 Moderation Effect that Employees’ Information Technology Knowledge Has on the 
Relationship between Anticipated Regret and Intention to Whistle-Blow 
One cannot easily determine whether anticipated regret about remaining silent triggers an employee to 
whistle-blow because, apart from whistle-blowing, employees have other options to stay away from 
wrongdoings. For instance, they may choose to tolerate the action, remain passive and silent, or even 
leave their organization (Hoffmann, 2006; Kaptein, 2002). We argue that, when an employee understands 
more about the potential harm that a confidentiality breach can cause to the public, then the employee will 
be more likely to whistle-blow. Using the 2018 Facebook scandal as an example, if an employee thinks  
80 Understanding the Whistle-blowing Intention to Report Breach of Confidentiality 
 
Volume 47  DOI: 10.17705/1CAIS.04704 Paper 4  
 
that businesses use Facebook data only to generate marketing advertisements, then the employee may 
choose to tolerate the act and have a low intention to whistle-blow. Conversely, if the employee realizes 
that political consultants can use Facebook data to bias presidential campaigns, then the employee may 
be more likely to whistle-blow. 
We also need to consider which factors lead employees to better understand the potential harm that 
confidentiality breaches cause to the public. One such factor includes employees’ IT knowledge. 
Analyzing user information to obtain actionable business knowledge involves sophisticated technical 
skillsets, such as data mining and analytics. Many recent scandals have involved big data (e.g., 
Cambridge Analytica scandal involved social media data, the Apple iPhone scandal involved location 
data, and the HealthNet scandal involved customer records), which is characterized by high volume, high 
data-generation speeds, and a variety of unstructured data formats. Data mining and big data analytics 
involve using high-end technology and complex computer algorithms to transform data into actionable 
business knowledge. 
To elaborate, data mining involves extracting useful knowledge from digital data and sifting through it to 
identify information useful for prediction (Khan, Qureshi, & Hussain, 2014). Generally speaking, data 
mining relates to data warehouses (a large data store accumulated from various big data sources), cloud 
computing (a network of remote servers hosted on the Internet to store and process data), distributed 
computing (a network of high-performance computers for parallel processing), and deep learning and 
neural networks (a class of machine-learning methods based on learning data representations and 
nonlinear transformation for making predictions). Further, many companies merge multiple data types 
(such as location data and customer transactions) to deduce people’s identities even when they deal with 
anonymous data (Bond-Graham, 2013; Ohm, 2012). 
We argue that the outcomes that organizations can accomplish with data mining and big data analytics 
can be difficult for laypeople to understand. Thus, employees who do not know what data mining and big 
data analytics involve may underestimate problems that confidentiality breaches can pose to the public. 
These employees may think that data mining leads only to annoying online advertising or, at most, allows 
organizations to identify individuals’ embarrassing information (Xu, Jiang, Wang, Yuan, & Ren, 2014). As 
a result, although they feel regret if something bad occurs, they lack confidence in how they judge 
wrongdoings associated with confidentiality breaches and, subsequently, have a low intention to whistle-
blow. 
In contrast, employees with IT knowledge can better understand why a company mines transactional data, 
how it merges multiple data sources to create a profile for individuals, and how it uses these profiles to 
understand their preferences and manipulate their future behavior. Therefore, these employees can more 
precisely assess data mining’s potential risks to the public. Combined with anticipated regret as a trigger, 
they will be more likely to take action to minimize the threat from data mining and big data analytics to 
society than employees with low IT knowledge. Thus, we hypothesize: 
H2: Anticipated regret about remaining silent exerts a stronger effect on intentions to whistle-blow 
for employees with high IT knowledge compared to employees with low IT knowledge. 
3.2.3 Moderation Effect that Organizational Policies Have on the Relationship between 
Anticipated Regret and Intention to Whistle-Blow 
We next examine how organizations can more proactively encourage employees to act when they 
discover confidentiality breaches in the workplace. For instance, organizations can consider establishing 
organization policies that outline information confidentiality protection acts and regulations in relation to 
handling individuals’ personal data. Such policies articulate the importance of information confidentiality 
and instruct employees to deal with tasks in daily operations or to respond to requirements to comply with 
legislation, regulation, and codes of practice (Kohnke, Sigler, & Shoemaker, 2016). In brief, these policies 
communicate management’s behavioral expectations about information protection to employees. We 
argue that the presence of these policies in an organization strengthen the relationship between 
anticipated regret and whistle-blowing intentions for three reasons, which we discuss below. 
First, organizational policies in relation to information confidentiality help employees understand that any 
confidentiality breach constitutes a risk to the organization and even a threat to the public. Organizational 
policies also outline the crucial role that every employee needs to play in protecting information 
confidentiality. Moreover, the policies inform employees about how the organization supports them in 
handling confidentiality breaches (Doherty & Fulford, 2006; Maynard, Ruighaver, & Ahmad, 2011). As a 
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result, when organizations establish policies in relation to information confidentiality, employees better 
know their rights and responsibilities. Thus, when they witness their colleagues commit wrongdoings, they 
will be likely to whistle-blow. 
Second, by establishing organizational policies in relation to confidentiality breaches, an organization 
signals its values to its employees. Organizational values comprise the organization’s thoughts, beliefs, 
and actions. When employees do not know the organizational values, they may experience value 
conflicts. In our research context, when employees do not know the extent to which the organization 
values information confidentiality, they do not know if they should follow personal ethics or organizational 
norms in handling confidentiality breach (Erwin & Moncrieff, 2008; Smith, 1993). Employees may struggle 
to reconcile their personal concerns with the organizational norms and try to resolve these dilemmas by 
subjugating their personal beliefs to the organizational norms (Erwin & Moncrieff, 2008; Smith, 1993). 
Thus, by establishing organizational policies, organizations can signal to employees to maintain their 
personal ethical standards to act on confidentiality breaches in the workplace. 
Third, organizational policies enable employees to understand their choices and opportunities when they 
witness confidentiality breaches. When employees witness wrongdoings, they may initially choose to 
remain silent. This “inaction” decision remains in their mind. Organizational policies inform employees 
about the options they possess to alter their prior inaction decision. The more employees reevaluate their 
prior inaction, the more they feel that they can act differently to alter the “mistakes” that their prior inaction 
caused and the stronger their desire to correct the prior inaction (Gilovich & Medvec, 1995), which 
promotes their intentions to whistle-blow. Thus, we hypothesize: 
H3: Employees’ anticipated regret about remaining silent exerts a stronger effect on their 
intentions to whistle-blow when their organization has organizational policies about 
maintaining information credibility compared to when their organization does not. 
4 Method 
4.1 Pretest 
We followed Keil et al. (2018) to employ experiments with hypothetical scenarios to seek individuals’ 
opinions about whistle-blowing. Before the main experiment, we recruited 28 university students to 
participate in a pretest. On average, it took them 20 minutes to complete the entire experiment. All 
students reported that they could easily understand the scenarios we used, but students without any work 
experience had some difficulty in understanding work ethics. Inspired by their comments, we interviewed 
six students with different levels of work experience to learn about how they understood work ethics. We 
found that students with a few months’ work experience could elaborate their thoughts about work ethics 
well. Thus, in the main experiment, we recruited individuals who had at least three months’ work 
experience. 
4.2 Sample 
In contrast to Keil et al. (2018), who adopted a laboratory experiment, we conducted an online experiment 
that we promoted via social media. By doing so, we could reach more potential subjects. According to the 
results from the pretests, we sought participants who had at least three months’ work experience. We 
considered these people an appropriate target because they understood workplace ethics. Respondents 
could begin the online experiment at any time and place. In total, 612 respondents started the online 
experiment, and we collected 473 usable data points. Further, 329 participants were females and 144 
were males. The average age was 25. Of the 473 respondents, 361 (76%) had more than 18 months’ 
work experience. 
Nonresponse bias, which can occur when respondents differ from nonrespondents, posed a concern for 
our study. To assess nonresponse biases, we compared the means for the demographics and major 
variables for early and late respondents. Other statistical tests, including demographic profiles and major 
variables in the model, were not significant. The only significantly different variable was age—early 
respondents tended to be younger than late respondents (p < 0.1)—an unsurprising result because young 
people tend to actively use social media and, thus, respond earlier. 
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4.3 Experiment Procedures 
After the respondents began the experiment, we asked them to provide basic information about their 
demographics and work experience. Following this, we presented them with a case about a drug company 
that mined patients’ healthcare records. We show this case, which we based on Keil et al. (2018)’s case 
with two modifications, in Appendix A. The first modification involved replacing HIPAA with the Privacy 
and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 in Australia because we recruited subjects in Australia. The 
second modification involved the number of scenarios we presented to subjects. Keil et al. (2018) 
examined the cross-sectional effect that that attributions have on anticipated regret; thus, they offered one 
scenario to each subject. In contrast, we examined the longitudinal change in anticipated regret. Thus, in 
our experiment, we presented three scenarios with the same company to describe a situation in which a 
colleague mined patients’ healthcare records over time. After viewing each occasion, the subjects 
reported their opinions on the confidentiality breach, their anticipated regret, and their whistle-blowing 
intentions. At the end, we asked some open-ended questions to collect feedback from the subjects. The 
experiment took about 20 minutes. 
4.4 Design and Measures 
We did not manipulate the subjects’ IT knowledge. Instead, we asked them to self-report their knowledge 
about 11 concepts related to data mining on a nine-point Likert scale (1 = “not knowledgeable about” to 
9 = “very knowledgeable about”) and computed the first score (i.e., the average of these 11 questions). 
We also asked them two open-ended questions about Web clickstream analysis and location tracking. 
Two researchers independently assessed their answers to assign the second score, which had nine 
marks in total. To measure subjects’ IT knowledge, we averaged the two scores. 
We manipulated the presence of organizational policies in the drug company through involving two groups 
in the experiment. We told the first group (the “with-policy” group) that the drug company had policies to 
encourage employees with ethical concerns to discuss them internally before proceeding to whistle-blow 
externally in order to create an overall environment in which employees had the opportunity and desire to 
behave ethically and responsibly. We also described the Australian Privacy and Personal Information 
Protection Act 1998 to the first group. We did not provide the second group (the “without-policy” group) 
any information about organizational policies or describe the Privacy and Personal Information Protection 
Act 1998. 
We did not employ a full-factorial experiment design to test the effects that stability, controllability, and 
intentionality had on the anticipated regret about remaining silent because we did not intend to test their 
interactions. We followed Keil et al. (2018) to present scenarios with variations in company’s wrongdoing’s 
stability, controllability, and intentionality and allowed the subjects to freely form their own perceptions 
about the company’s wrongdoing. We asked the subjects to self-report their perceptions. In doing so, we 
would find variance in how the subjects perceived stability, controllability, and intentionality. We present 
the instruments we used in our experiments in Appendix B. We present the descriptive statistics of our key 
variables in Table 2. 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Variable Mean (SD) Correlation 
 Group 1 Group 2 A1 B1 C1 X1 X2 X3 
A1 3.96 (1.18) 1.96 (0.83) 1      
B1 3.29 (1.18) 1.65 (0.90) 0.03 1     
C1 5.00 (1.65) 4.45 (2.85) 0.51** 0.10* 1    
X1 4.25 (0.81) 2.02 (1.16) 0.45** 0.10* 0.50** 1   
X2 6.04 (0.80) 5.67 (2.31) 0.02 0.31** 0.16** 0.42** 1  
X3 6.90 (1.35) 7.16 (2.27) -0.09 -0.11* -0.04 0.30** 0.34** 1 
W3 7.84 (1.19) 4.05 (2.20) 0.42** 0.04 0.53** 0.82** 0.45** 0.45** 
Notes: A1 = stability at t1; B1 = controllability at t1; C1 = intentionality at t1; X1 = anticipated regret at t1; W3 = whistle-blowing 
intentions at t3. ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. 
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4.5 Latent Growth Model Approach 
We conducted LGM analysis using AMOS 17.0 to test our three hypotheses. LGM, a statistical technique 
for analyzing longitudinal data, emphasizes the change in trajectory in the outcome variable over time 
(Duncan et al., 1994) (in our case, anticipated regret’s trajectory). LGM analysis suits efforts to analyze 
changes in behavior when one has an a priori hypothesis about changes in trajectory over time (i.e., 
slope) (Duncan, Duncan, & Stoolmiller, 1994), which H1 focused on. 
LGM created a regression-type line for the outcome variable (anticipated regret) for each person over time 
(Byrne, 2016). We estimated two latent factors: one that represented the subject’s baseline anticipated 
regret (the intercept) and one that represented changes in anticipated regret over time (the slope). These 
factors corresponded to the distinctions we define in Section 3 between initiation and change in the 
dependent variables of interest. To represent individuals’ baseline level of anticipated regret, we created 
the intercept factor with a fixed loading of 1.0 at each wave. To represent individuals’ changing anticipated 
regret over time, we created the slope factor with a fixed loading of 0.0 at T1 and, thereby, established the 
other factor as the intercept. We assumed strict linearity in the slope factor in which case we would fix the 
slope loadings to 0.0, 0.5, and 1.0 to represent three equally spaced measurement occasions (Byrne, 
2016). The perceptual variables at T1 (stability, controllability, and intentionality) were the predictor 
variables of primary interest. All predictors in the model were from T1 so that the predictive relations would 
be prospective. We used individuals’ anticipated regret at T1, T2, and T3 to predict their intention to 
whistle-blow. Following Keil et al. (2018), we controlled for the effect that demographic variables (age, 
gender, work experience, and personal risk of reporting the failure) had on individuals’ intention to whistle-
blow. 
We separated our LGM analysis for the two groups we used in the experiment. For the without-policy 
group, we ran LGM analysis with 224 data points. The mean intercept of anticipated regret was 1.41, 
which corresponds to the mean of anticipated regret (2.02) at T1. The mean slope was 5.04. Both the 
mean intercept and the mean slope were significantly greater than zero (p < 0.01). For the with-policy 
group, we ran LGM analysis with 249 data points. The mean intercept of anticipated regret was 3.59, 
which corresponds roughly to the mean of anticipated regret (4.23) at T1. The mean slope was 3.47. A 
positive mean slope concurs with an increase in anticipated regret over time. Both the mean intercept and 
the mean slope were significantly greater than zero (p < 0.01). Taking the two groups together, 
organizational policies promoted a higher starting value of anticipated regret at T1 (3.59 > 1.41), but a 
smaller slope of anticipated regret (from T1 to T3) (3.47 < 5.04) over time. 
5 Hypotheses Testing 
5.1 Hypothesis 1 
H1 posits that, when an employee views a colleague repeatedly commit a wrongdoing related to 
confidentiality breaches, the employee’s perceptions about its a) stability, b) controllability, and c) 
intentionality cause the employee’s anticipated regret to increase over time. To test it, we first ran LGM 
analysis with 249 data points from the with-policy group. We found that perceived stability of a 
wrongdoer’s act did not have any effect on the slope of anticipated regret (estimate = -0.08, p > 0.1) or on 
its intercept (estimate = 0.06, p > 0.1). Thus, we did not find support for H1a. Next, we found that 
perceived controllability exerted a positive effect on the starting point of anticipated regret 
(estimate = 0.18, p < 0.01) and its slope (estimate = 0.25, p < 0.01). Thus, we found support for H1B. 
Finally, we found that perceived intentionality exerted a positive effect on the slope of anticipated regret 
(estimate = 0.18, p < 0.1). Thus, we found marginal support for H1c. 
We then analyzed 224 data points from the without-policy group. We found that perceived stability of a 
wrongdoer’s act did not have any effect on the slope of anticipated regret (estimate = 0.10, p > 0.1). Thus, 
we did not find support for H1a. However, we found that perceived stability exerted an effect on the 
starting point of anticipated regret (estimate = 0.27, p < 0.01). This finding indicates that the subject’s 
perceived stability did not affect the change in trajectory in anticipated regret but did affect its starting 
value. Next, we found that perceived controllability exerted a positive effect on the slope of anticipated 
regret (estimate = 0.09, p < 0.01). Thus, we found support for H1b. Finally, we found that perceived 
intentionality exerted a positive effect on the slope of anticipated regret (estimate = 0.29, p < 0.01). Thus, 
we found support for H1c. 
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Taking the analyses together, we found that a subject’s perceived controllability and intentionality affected 
how anticipated regret changed over time, yet perceived stability influenced the starting point of 
anticipated regret but not its slope. Our findings imply that, regardless of whether an organization has 
implemented organizational policies, the way people perceive a wrongdoing’s controllability and 
intentionality (but not stability) affect how anticipated regret changes over time. Perceived stability’s 
nonsignificant effect probably resulted due to the nature of digital data. To elaborate, to commit financial 
fraud, an employee may make multiple transactions to transfer money out from an organization’s account 
to avoid attracting attention. Stability indicates a wrongdoing’s severity. In contrast, one can easily copy 
and transfer digital data, and one could potentially transfer millions of transactions with a mouse click. 
Therefore, people may not need to observe multiple data transfers to confirm such a wrongdoing’s 
severity. 
5.2 Hypotheses 2 and 3 
H2 posits that anticipated regret about remaining silent exerts a stronger effect on intentions to whistle-
blow for employees with high IT knowledge compared to employees with low IT knowledge. We merged 
our two datasets and used 473 data points to run a regression with whistle-blowing intentions as the 
dependent variable to test this hypothesis. The independent variables included the average of anticipated 
regret across the three time points, employees’ IT knowledge, organizational policies, and their 
interactions. We controlled for the effect that age, gender, work experience, and fear of retaliation had on 
whistle-blowing intentions. Fear of retaliation exerted a negative effect (estimate = -0.21, p < 0.01) on 
whistle-blowing intentions. Females had a weaker intention than males (p < 0.05). Age and work 
experience did not exert any significant effect on whistle-blowing intentions. 
We found that the interaction between employees’ IT knowledge and anticipated regret was nonsignificant 
for whistle-blowing intentions (estimate = -0.46, p > 0.1). Thus, we did not find support for H2. However, 
we found that IT knowledge had a significant positive main effect on whistle-blowing intentions 
(estimate = 2.45, p < 0.05). The positive estimate suggests that employees with high IT knowledge tend to 
form a stronger intention to whistle-blow when they see colleagues commit a wrongdoing than do 
employees with low IT knowledge. We undertook a median split to divide the 473 data points into high IT 
knowledge and low IT knowledge groups. The mean of whistle-blowing intentions of the group with high IT 
knowledge was 6.59, and the mean of the group with low IT knowledge was 5.09. We found a significant 
difference between the two means (t = 6.58, p < 0.01). 
We then examined the presence of organizational policies. The interaction between the presence of 
organizational policies and anticipated regret exerted a significant effect (estimate = 0.65, p < 0.01) on 
whistle-blowing intentions. The positive estimate suggests that organizational policy promotes a stronger 
intention to whistle-blow when employees see wrongdoings. The mean whistle-blowing intention of the 
with-policy group was 7.84, and the mean of the without-policy group was 4.05. We found a significant 
difference between the two means (t = 23.64, p < 0.01). Hence, we found support for H3. Table 3 
summarizes our findings. 
Table 3. Summary of Main Findings 
Hypothesis Result 
H1a:  When an employee views a colleague repeatedly commit a wrongdoing related to confidentiality 
breaches, the employee’s perceptions about its stability cause the employee’s anticipated regret to 
increase over time. 
Not 
supported 
H1b: When an employee views a colleague repeatedly commit a wrongdoing related to confidentiality 
breaches, the employee’s perceptions about its controllability cause the employee’s anticipated regret to 
increase over time. 
Supported 
H1c: When an employee views a colleague repeatedly commit a wrongdoing related to confidentiality 
breaches, the employee’s perceptions about its intentionality cause the employee’s anticipated regret to 
increase over time. 
Supported 
H2: Anticipated regret about remaining silent exerts a stronger effect on their intentions to whistle-blow 
for employees with high IT knowledge compared to employees with low IT knowledge. 
Supported 
H3: Employees’ anticipated regret about remaining silent exerts a stronger effect on their intentions to 
whistle-blow when their organization has organizational policies about maintaining information credibility 
compared to when their organization does not. 
Supported 
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6 Discussion 
6.1 Theoretical and Practical Contributions 
With this study, we contribute to the organization security literature by extending its focus to individuals’ 
whistle-blowing. Given that organizations have widely adopted IS and electronic commerce, they digitalize 
data to enhance their operations and make intelligent decisions (Debatin et al., 2009; lachello & Hong, 
2007; Sutlieff & Chelin, 2010). However, such practices raise concerns about information confidentiality. 
These practices may lead to not only inadvertent disclosure of personal information but also damaged 
reputation, unwanted harassment, hacking, and identity theft (Debatin et al., 2009; lachello & Hong, 2007). 
Information confidentiality represents an ethical and legal problem for the public (Debatin et al., 2009; 
lachello & Hong, 2007). Inspired by recent scandals in which employees leaked user data to third parties, 
we examine ways to promote whistle-blowing when an individual observes confidentiality breaches by 
their colleagues in the workplace. In particular, our study contributes to theory and practice in three ways. 
First, our study confirms that employees care about information confidentiality. When employees notice 
confidentiality breaches, they become alert, and some regret if they choose to remain silent. These 
findings align with the literature on whistle-blowing in relation to financial fraud (Kaplan & Schultz, 2007). 
Adding to the literature, our study indicates that, when employees see confidentiality breaches, their 
anticipated regret increases over time, although some employees do not take immediate action for various 
reasons (e.g., some may suffer a conflict between loyalty to the organization and loyalty to a wider 
constituency, and some may be worried about retaliation). This finding represents good news for 
organizations and society—people understand that confidentiality breaches are unethical and possibly 
illegal and have a sense of responsibility to protect information confidentiality. Our study extends the 
organization security literature’s focus to individuals’ whistle-blowing and highlights an IS research agenda 
around whistle-blowing in relation to confidentiality breaches. 
Second, our study indicates that people with high IT knowledge are more likely to report wrongdoings, and 
people with low IT knowledge may regret remaining silent but lack confidence in their judgment and 
choose not to whistle-blow. Without IT training, even if employees know about ethical principles and 
information confidentiality, they lack the knowledge to detect individual employees who leak information to 
third parties. Thus, their poor judgment leads to lower whistle-blowing intentions and a failure to report 
confidentiality breaches. Therefore, to promote employees’ intentions to protect information confidentiality, 
organizations should provide both work ethics workshops and IT training related to information 
confidentiality.  IT training could focus on big data analytics in commercial applications and information 
handling in data centers and warehouses. For example, since 2016, the Bank of New York Mellon 
Corporation, a global banking and finance company, has offered data analytics training to its employees 
and integrated this training into their commercial applications (Wang, 2016). Since early 2018, National 
Australia Bank (NAB, 2018), one of the largest banks in Australia, has started providing a cloud skills 
training program to employees to handle digital data. Given the digital era, organizations should provide IT 
training to all staff to increase their awareness of data leaks and confidentiality breaches. 
Third, our study confirms that organization policies can promote whistle-blowing intentions. Despite 
organizations’ efforts to increase data security, management may not know that individual employees 
have leaked data to third parties. To minimize this risk, organizations can establish policies to inform all 
employees about organizational values and provide support to whistle-blowers. Further, we suggest that 
governments place more emphasis on the importance of information confidentiality. Governments already 
allocate resources for fraud-control arrangements. For instance, in the United States, the SEC 
Enforcement Division’s Financial Reporting and Audit Group identifies and prosecutes securities law 
violations related to financial reporting and audit failures. Governments invest relatively less resources in 
preventing, detecting, and dealing with information confidentiality. For example, in the United States, the 
Federal Trade Commission regulates laws to protect consumers’ privacy (O’Conner, 2018). However, no 
single federal regulation mandates organizations to establish an information confidentiality policy; rather, 
the country focuses on industry self-regulation (O’Conner, 2018). Europe has taken the lead on privacy 
policy. The European Union implemented the General Data Protection Law (GDPR) from 25 May, 2018 
(Ashford, 2018; Yu, 2018). This law protects individual personal information and applies to all 
organizations that deal with the data of European Union citizens (Ashford, 2018; Yu, 2018). The GDPR 
mandates that organizations, such as Facebook, must ask for consent from users before they collect their 
personal information. Organizations also need to explain in detail why they need users’ information and 
how they use it (Ashford 2018; Yu 2018). The data that the GDPR covers include credit numbers, travel 
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records, religious affiliations, Web search results, biometric data from wearable fitness monitors, and 
Internet protocol addresses (Ashford, 2018; Yu, 2018). Although the GDPR represents a big step toward 
information confidentiality, it remains inadequate on its own. For example, many organizations have 
developed artificial intelligence algorithms to analyze people’s behavior on social media and mobile apps, 
which the GDPR does not cover and intellectual property rights protect (Ashford, 2018; Yu, 2018). 
Information confidentiality certainly constitutes a complex issue to which governments must devote 
increased attention. Collaborative efforts between governments and organizations can prevent individual 
employees leaking organizational data to third parties. 
6.2 Limitations and Future Research 
Our study has several limitations. First, we recruited our subjects online through social media. Although 
recruiting subjects online meant we could extend and diversify our sample, these subjects generally hold 
stronger computer knowledge than individuals who have never used social media. Their stronger 
computer knowledge might have caused a favorable effect on understanding the severity of digital 
information infringements. Second, individuals’ ethical standards that guide their whistle-blowing 
behaviors may depend on culture, which we do not consider in our study. Thus, we encourage future 
research to explore how culture is associated with anticipated regret and whistle-blowing intentions. Third, 
we used healthcare as the experiment context to study confidentiality breaches. In general, people are 
sensitive to confidentiality breaches in relation to health information. Future research could explore 
whether our research model applies to examine other types of confidentiality breaches, such as 
transaction records, location trails, and personal emails. 
7 Conclusions 
In this paper, we focus on wrongdoings related to confidentiality breaches and examine how wrongdoing 
attributions affect the trajectory of anticipated regret and whistle-blowing intentions. We draw on attribution 
theory to develop three hypotheses and test them with data that we collected in an experiment. Our 
findings indicate that how employees perceive a wrongdoing’s controllability and intentionality (but not 
stability) affect how their anticipated regret about remaining silent changes over time (H1). In addition, 
high IT knowledge (H2) and the presence of organizational policies (H3) promote whistle-blowing 
intentions. With this paper, we contribute to the literature by highlighting how whistle-blowers’ anticipated 
regret about remaining silent changes over time. In addition, we pinpoint the challenge of encouraging 
employees who have observed wrongdoings to take action. We suggest two approaches to address this 
challenge: 1) equip employees with strong IT knowledge to handle sensitive data and 2) establish 
organizational policies on information confidentiality. These actionable suggestions can help organizations 
reinforce professionalism and ethical behavior in relation to handling confidential data in the workplace. 
Acknowledgments 
We thank the Editor in Chief, the Associate Editor, and the two reviewers for their valuable feedback. 
Communications of the Association for Information Systems 87 
 
Volume 47  DOI: 10.17705/1CAIS.04704 Paper 4  
 
References 
Abraham, C., & Sheeran, P. (2003). Acting on intentions: The role of anticipated regret. British Journal of 
Social Psychology, 42(4), 495-511.  
Ambrose, S. F., Jr., & Gelb, J. W. (2001). Consumer privacy regulation and litigation: The business 
lawyer. Chicago, 56(3), 1157-1178.  
Ashford, W. (2018). New UK data protection act not welcomed by all. ComputerWeekly. Retrieved from 
https://www.computerweekly.com/news/252441814/New-UK-Data-Protection-Act-not-welcomed-by-
all 
Bond-Graham, D. (2013). Iron cagebook. Counterpunch. Retrieved from 
https://www.counterpunch.org/2013/12/03/iron-cagebook/ 
Boss, S., Galletta, D., Lowry, P. B., Moody, G. D., & Polak, P. (2015). What do systems users have to 
fear? Using fear appeals to engender threats and fear that motivate protective security 
behaviors. MIS Quarterly, 39(4), 837-864. 
Buckley, C., Cotter, D., Hutchinson, M., & O’Leary, C. (2010). Empirical evidence of lack of significant 
support for whistleblowing. Corporate Ownership and Control, 7(3), 275-283.  
Bulgurcu, B., Cavusoglu, H., & Benbasast, I. (2010). Information security policy compliance: An empirical 
study of rationality-based beliefs and information security awareness. MIS Quarterly, 34(3), 523-
548.  
Byrne, B. M. (2016). Structural equation modeling with AMOS: Basic concepts, applications, and 
programming. New York, NY: Routledge. 
Campbell, K., Gordon, L. A., Loeb, M. P., & Zhou, L. (2003). The economic cost of publicly announced 
information security breaches: Empirical evidence from the stock market. Journal of Computer 
Security, 11(3), 431-448. 
Ciasullo, M. V., Cosimato, S., & Palumbo, R. (2017). Improving health care quality: The implementation of 
whistleblowing. The TQM Journal, 29(1), 167-183.  
Culiberg, B., & Mihelič, K. K. (2017). The evolution of whistleblowing studies: A critical review and 
research agenda. Journal of Business Ethics, 146(4), 787-803.  
Danis, M., Farrar, A., Grady, C., Taylor, C., O’Donnell, P., Soeken, K., & Ulrich, C. (2008). Does fear of 
retaliation deter requests for ethics consultation? Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, 11(1), 27-
34.  
Debatin, B., Lovejoy, J. P., Horn, A. K., & Hughes, B. N. (2009). Facebook and online privacy: Attitudes, 
behaviors, and unintended consequences. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 15(1), 
83-108.  
Doherty, N. F., & Fulford, H. (2006). Aligning the information security policy with the strategic information 
systems plan. Computers & Security, 25(1), 55-63.  
Duncan, T. E., Duncan, S. C., & Stoolmiller, M. (1994). Modeling developmental processes using latent 
growth structural equation methodology. Applied Psychological Measurement, 18(4), 343-354. 
Erwin, G., & Moncrieff, M. (2008). Investing in online privacy policy for small business as part of B2C web 
site management: Issues and challenges In K. Klinger, K. Rosh, J. Neidig & J. Snavely (Eds.), 
Information communication technologies: Concepts, methodologies, tools, and applications (pp. 
2998-3006). New York, NY: IGI Global. 
Fredin, A. J. (2011). The effects of anticipated regret on the whistleblowing decision. Ethics & Behavior, 
21(5), 404-427.  
Gilovich, T., & Medvec, V. H. (1995). The experience of regret: What, when, and why. Psychological 
Review, 102(2), 379-395.  
Griffin, E. (1991). Attribution theory of Firitz Heider In S. Gouijinstook & T.Z. Ackley (Eds.), A first look at 
communication theory (pp. 137-145). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill. 
88 Understanding the Whistle-blowing Intention to Report Breach of Confidentiality 
 
Volume 47  DOI: 10.17705/1CAIS.04704 Paper 4  
 
Gundlach, M. J., Douglas, S. C., & Martinko, M. J. (2003). The decision to blow the whistle: A social 
information processing framework. Academy of Management Review, 28(1), 107-123.  
Gundlach, M. J., Martinko, M. J., & Douglas, S. C. (2008). A new approach to examining whistle-blowing: 
The influence of cognitions and anger. SAM Advanced Management Journal, 73(4), 40-50.  
Guo, K. H., & Yu, X. (2019). The anonymous online self: Toward an understanding of the tension between 
discipline and online anonymity. Information Systems Journal, 30(1), 48-69. 
Hann, I.-H., Hui, K.-L., Lee, S.-Y. T., & Png, I. P. (2007). Overcoming online information privacy concerns: 
An information-processing theory approach. Journal of Management Information Systems, 24(2), 
13-42.  
Harrison-Walker, L. J. (2012). The role of cause and affect in service failure. Journal of Services 
Marketing, 26(2), 115-123.  
Harvey, P., Martinko, M. J., & Borkowski, N. (2017). Justifying deviant behavior: The role of attributions 
and moral emotions. Journal of Business Ethics, 141(4), 779-795.  
Hoffmann, E. A. (2006). Exit and voice: Organizational loyalty and dispute resolution strategies. Social 
Forces, 84(4), 2313-2330.  
Hwang, D., Staley, B., Te Chen, Y., & Lan, J.-S. (2008). Confucian culture and whistle-blowing by 
professional accountants: An exploratory study. Managerial Auditing Journal, 23(5), 504-526.  
Iachello, G., & Hong, J. (2007). End-user privacy in human-computer interaction. Foundations and Trends 
in human–computer interaction, 1(1), 1-137.  
Iglesias, V., Varela-Neira, C., & Vázquez-Casielles, R. (2015). Why didn’t it work out? The effects of 
attributions on the efficacy of recovery strategies. Journal of Service Theory and Practice, 25(6), 
700-724.  
Imhoff, R., Wohl, M. J., & Erb, H. P. (2013). When the past is far from dead: How ongoing consequences 
of genocides committed by the ingroup impact collective guilt. Journal of Social Issues, 69(1), 74-
91.  
Itzkin, A., Van Dijk, D., & Azar, O. H. (2016). At least I tried: The relationship between regulatory focus 
and regret following action vs. inaction. Frontiers in Psychology, 7, 1-16.  
Kankanhalli, A., Teo, H. H., Tan, B. C. Y., & Wei, K. K. (2003). An integrative study of information systems 
security effectiveness. International Journal of Information Management, 23(2), 139-154. 
Kannan, K., Rees, J., & Sridhar, S. (2007). Market reactions to information security breach 
announcements: An empirical analysis. International Journal of Electronic Commerce, 12(1), 69-91. 
Kaplan, S. E., & Schultz, J. J. (2007). Intentions to report questionable acts: An examination of the 
influence of anonymous reporting channel, internal audit quality, and setting. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 71(2), 109-124.  
Kaptein, M. (2002). Guidelines for the development of an ethics safety net. Journal of Business Ethics, 
41(3), 217-234.  
Kaptein, M. (2011). From inaction to external whistleblowing: The influence of the ethical culture of 
organizations on employee responses to observed wrongdoing. Journal of Business Ethics, 98(3), 
513-530.  
Keil, M., Park, E. H., & Ramesh, B. (2018). Violations of health information privacy: The role of attributions 
and anticipated regret in shaping whistle‐blowing intentions. Information Systems Journal, 28(5), 
818-848.  
Keil, M., Tiwana, A., Sainsbury, R., & Sneha, S. (2010). Toward a theory of whistleblowing intentions: A 
benefit‐to‐cost differential perspective. Decision Sciences, 41(4), 787-812.  
Khan, A., Qureshi, M. S., & Hussain, A. (2014). Improved genetic algorithm approach for sensitive 
association rules hiding. World Applied Sciences Journal, 31(12), 2087-2092.  
King, G. (2001). Perceptions of intentional wrongdoing and peer reporting behavior among registered 
nurses. Journal of Business Ethics, 34(1), 1-13.  
Communications of the Association for Information Systems 89 
 
Volume 47  DOI: 10.17705/1CAIS.04704 Paper 4  
 
Kohnke, A., Sigler, K., & Shoemaker, D. (2016). The complete guide to cybersecurity risks and controls. 
Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press. 
Langenderfer, J., & Cook, D. L. (2004). Oh, what a tangled web we weave: The state of privacy protection 
in the information economy and recommendations for governance. Journal of Business Research, 
57(7), 734-747.  
Lee, H. K., Keil, M., Smith, H. J., & Sarkar, S. (2017). The roles of mood and conscientiousness in 
reporting of self‐committed errors on IT projects. Information Systems Journal, 27(5), 589-617. 
Lerner, J. S., Li, Y., Valdesolo, P., & Kassam, K. S. (2015). Emotion and decision making. Annual Review 
of Psychology, 66, 799-823.  
Lowry, P. B., Moody, G. D., Galletta, D. F., & Vance, A. (2013). The drivers in the use of online whistle-
blowing reporting systems. Journal of Management Information Systems, 30(1), 153-190. 
Mamonov, S., Koufaris, M., & Benbunan-Fich, R. (2017). The role of user psychological contracts in the 
sustainability of social networks. Communications of the Association for Information Systems, 40, 
218-248. 
Maynard, S., Ruighaver, A., & Ahmad, A. (2011). Stakeholders in security policy development. In 
Proceedings of the 9th Australian Information Security Management Conference. 
Mesmer-Magnus, J. R., & Viswesvaran, C. (2005). Whistleblowing in organizations: An examination of 
correlates of whistleblowing intentions, actions, and retaliation. Journal of Business Ethics, 62(3), 
277-297.  
Miceli, M. P., & Near, J. P. (1984). The relationships among beliefs, organizational position, and whistle-
blowing status: A discriminant analysis. Academy of Management Journal, 27(4), 687-705.  
Miceli, M. P., & Near, J. P. (1985). Characteristics of organizational climate and perceived wrongdoing 
associated with whistle‐blowing decisions. Personnel Psychology, 38(3), 525-544.  
Miceli, M. P., & Near, J. P. (1992). Blowing the whistle: The organizational and legal implications for 
companies and employees. New York, NY: Lexington Books. 
Miceli, M. P., & Near, J. P. (2002). What makes whistle-blowers effective? Three field studies. Human 
Relations, 55(4), 455-479.  
Morrison, E. W., & Milliken, F. J. (2000). Organizational silence: A barrier to change and development in a 
pluralistic world. Academy of Management Review, 25(4), 706-725.  
NAB. (2018). NAB lauches Cloud Guild to develop AWS skills. Retrieved from 
https://news.nab.com.au/news_room_posts/nab-launches-cloud-guild-to-develop-aws-
skills/#resources 
Near, J. P., & Miceli, M. P. (1985). Organizational dissidence: The case of whistle-blowing. Journal of 
Business Ethics & Behavior, 4, 1-4.  
O'Conner, N. (2018). Reforming the U.S. approach to data protection and privacy. Council on Foreign 
Relations. Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/report/reforming-us-approach-data-protection 
Ohm, P. (2012). Don’t build a database of ruin. Harvard Business Review. Retrieved from 
https://hbr.org/2012/08/dont-build-a-database-of-ruin 
Orsingher, C., Hogreve, J., & Ordanini, A. (2016). Building on the past: Advancing theory in services 
through meta-analysis. Journal of Service Management, 27(1), 37-42.  
Padayachee, K. (2016). An assessment of opportunity-reducing techniques in information security: An 
insider threat perspective. Decision Support Systems, 92, 47-56. 
Posey, C., Roberts, T. L., Lowry, P. B., Bennett, R. J., & Courtney, J. F. (2013). Insiders’ protection of 
organizational information assets: Development of a systematics-based taxonomy and theory of 
diversity for protection-motivated behaviors. MIS Quarterly, 37(4), 1189-1210. 
Posey, C., Roberts, T. L., & Lowry, P. B. (2015). The impact of organizational commitment on insiders’ 
motivation to protect organizational information assets. Journal of Management Information 
Systems, 32(4), 179-214. 
90 Understanding the Whistle-blowing Intention to Report Breach of Confidentiality 
 
Volume 47  DOI: 10.17705/1CAIS.04704 Paper 4  
 
Rajagopal, P., Raju, S., & Unnava, H. R. (2006). Differences in the cognitive accessibility of action and 
inaction regrets. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 42(3), 302-313.  
Rehg, M. T., Miceli, M. P., Near, J. P., & Van Scotter, J. R. (2008). Antecedents and outcomes of 
retaliation against whistleblowers: Gender differences and power relationships. Organization 
Science, 19(2), 221-240.  
Renaud, K. (2012). Blaming noncompliance is too convenient: What really causes information breaches? 
IEEE Security & Privacy, 10(3), 57-63. 
Sandberg, T., Hutter, R., Richetin, J., & Conner, M. (2016). Testing the role of action and inaction 
anticipated regret on intentions and behaviour. British Journal of Social Psychology, 55(3), 407-425.  
Sander, D., & Scherer, K. (2009). Oxford companion to emotion and the affective sciences. Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press. 
Sims, R. L., & Keenan, J. P. (1998). Predictors of external whistleblowing: Organizational and 
intrapersonal variables. Journal of Business Ethics, 17(4), 411-421.  
Siponen, M., & Vance, A. (2010). Neutralization: New insights into the problem of employee information 
systems security policy violations. MIS Quarterly, 34(3), 487-502. 
Smith, H. J. (1993). Privacy policies and practices: Inside the organizational maze. Communications of the 
ACM, 36(12), 104-122.  
Smith, J. H., Dinev, T., & Xu, H. (2011). Information privacy research: An interdisciplinary review. MIS 
Quarterly, 35(4), 989-1016. 
Sutlieff, L., & Chelin, J. (2010). “An absolute prerequisite”: The importance of user privacy and trust in 
maintaining academic freedom at the library. Journal of Librarianship and Information Science, 
42(3), 163-177.  
Taylor, E. Z., & Curtis, M. B. (2010). An examination of the layers of workplace influences in ethical 
judgments: Whistleblowing likelihood and perseverance in public accounting. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 93(1), 21-37.  
Thompson, A. E., & O’Sullivan, L. F. (2017). Understanding variations in judgments of infidelity: An 
application of attribution theory. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 39(5), 262-276. 
Tim, Y., Pan, S. L., Bahri, S., & Fauzi, A. (2017). Digitally enabled crime-fighting communities: Harnessing 
the boundary spanning competence of social media for civic engagement. Information & 
Management, 54(2), 177-188.  
Towers, A., Williams, M. N., Hill, S. R., Philipp, M. C., & Flett, R. (2016). What makes for the most intense 
regrets? Comparing the effects of several theoretical predictors of regret intensity. Frontiers in 
Psychology, 7, 1-8.  
Vandekerckhove, W. (2018). Whistleblowing and information ethics: Facilitation, entropy, and ecopoiesis. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 152(1), 15-25.  
Van Offenbeek, M., Boonstra, A., & Seo, D. (2013). Towards integrating acceptance and resistance 
research: Evidence from a telecare case study. European Journal of Information Systems, 22(4), 
434-454. 
Varela-Neira, C., Vázquez-Casielles, R., & Iglesias, V. (2014). Intentionality attributions and humiliation: 
The impact on customer behavior. European Journal of Marketing, 48(5/6), 901-923.  
Wang, A. X. (2016). The future of staff training is getting employees to train themselves. Quartz. Retrieved 
from https://qz.com/770290/the-future-of-staff-training-is-getting-employees-to-train-themselves/ 
Weiner, B. (1972). Attribution theory, achievement motivation, and the educational process. Review of 
Educational Research, 42(2), 203-215.  
Weiner, B. (1985). An attributional theory of achievement motivation and emotion. Psychological Review, 
92(4), 548-573.  
Weiner, B. (1986). Attribution, emotion, and action. In R. M. Sorrentino & E. T. Higgins (Eds.), Handbook 
of motivation and cognition (pp. 281-312). New York, NY: Guilford. 
Communications of the Association for Information Systems 91 
 
Volume 47  DOI: 10.17705/1CAIS.04704 Paper 4  
 
Wong, K. F. E., Yik, M., & Kwong, J. Y. (2006). Understanding the emotional aspects of escalation of 
commitment: The role of negative affect. Journal of applied psychology, 91(2), 282.  
Xu, L., Jiang, C., Wang, J., Yuan, J., & Ren, Y. (2014). Information security in big data: Privacy and data 
mining. IEEE Access, 2, 1149-1176.  
Yu, H. (2018). GDPR isn’t enough to protect us in an age of smart algorithms. The Conversation.  
Retrieved from https://theconversation.com/gdpr-isnt-enough-to-protect-us-in-an-age-of-smart-
algorithms-97389 
Zeelenberg, M., Van Dijk, W. W., Manstead, A. S., & vanr de Pligt, J. (2000). On bad decisions and 
disconfirmed expectancies: The psychology of regret and disappointment. Cognition & Emotion, 
14(4), 521-541. 
Zhang, S., & Leidner, D. (2018). From improper to acceptable: How perpetrators neutralize workplace 
bullying behaviors in the cyber world. Information & Management, 55(7), 850-865. 
  
92 Understanding the Whistle-blowing Intention to Report Breach of Confidentiality 
 
Volume 47  DOI: 10.17705/1CAIS.04704 Paper 4  
 
Appendix A: Experiment Scenarios  
Scenario for Round 1 
You work for a drug company that has developed a Web-based system for individuals to maintain their 
electronic health records. You have recently learned that your supervisor is mining the protected health 
information and using it to market the company’s drug products. This use of protected health information 
violates the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act (1998) and could cause financial, 
reputational, or other harm if the information falls into the wrong hands. 
“In your company, all employees receive proper healthcare privacy training and should be aware that 
mining health records and using them for marketing purposes is in violation of the Privacy and Personal 
Information Protection Act (1998).” (Your supervisor is new to the healthcare industry and is completely 
unaware that mining health records and using them for marketing purposes is in violation of the Privacy 
and Personal Information Protection Act (1998).) “This is the first time your supervisor has illegally mined 
health records and used them for marketing purposes.” (This is not the first time your supervisor has 
illegally mined health records and used them for marketing purposes.) “There is a prior contract that 
mandates your department to share the results of data mining of health records with the drug company.” 
(There is no prior contract that mandates your department to share the results of data mining of health 
records with the drug company.) 
Now, you are faced with the decision about whether to draw your supervisor’s actions to the attention of 
others, such as the management of the company or even bodies outside the organization. If you decide to 
report your supervisor’s actions, you could upset management and even lose your job. However, if you 
remain silent, one or more individuals could suffer financial, reputational, or other harm if their protected 
health information falls into the wrong hands.  
Scenario for Round 2 
You have recently learned that your supervisor is again mining protected health information and using it to 
market the company’s drug products. 
“By now, your supervisor should have received proper healthcare privacy training offered by your 
company and should be aware that the mining of health records and its use for marketing purposes is in 
violation of the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act (1998).” (Without any healthcare privacy 
training, your supervisor is likely to be completely unaware that the mining of health records and using 
them for marketing purposes is in violation of the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act (1998).) 
“This is the second time your supervisor has illegally mined health records and used them for marketing 
purposes.” (You have witnessed a few times that your supervisor has illegally mined health records and 
used them for marketing purposes.) “There is a prior contract that mandates your department to share the 
results of data mining of health records with the drug company. This contract will expire in December 
2019.” (There is no prior contract that mandates your department to share the results of data mining of 
health records with the drug company.) 
Now, you are faced with the decision about whether to draw your supervisor’s actions to the attention of 
others, such as the management of the company or even bodies outside the organization. If you decide to 
report your supervisor’s actions, you could upset management and even lose your job. However, if you 
remain silent, one or more individuals could suffer financial, reputational, or other harm if their protected 
health information falls into the wrong hands. 
Scenario for Round 3 
You have recently learned that your supervisor is again mining protected health information and using it to 
market the company’s drug products. 
“By now, your supervisor should be aware that the mining of health records and using them for marketing 
purposes is in violation of the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act (1998).” (Without any 
healthcare privacy training, your supervisor may be completely unaware that the mining of health records 
and using them for marketing purposes is in violation of the Privacy and Personal Information Protection 
Act (1998).) “This is the third time your supervisor has illegally mined health records and used them for 
marketing purposes.” (You have witnessed a few times that your supervisor has illegally mined health 
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records and used them for marketing purposes.) “There is a prior contract that mandates your department 
to share the results of data mining of health records with the drug company. This contract has been 
extended for one more year until the end of 2020.” (There is no prior contract that mandates your 
department to share the results of data mining of health records with the drug company.) 
Now, you are faced with the decision about whether to draw your supervisor’s actions to the attention of 
others, such as the management of the company or even bodies outside the organization. If you decide to 
report your supervisor’s actions, you could upset management and even lose your job. However, if you 
remain silent, one or more individuals could suffer financial, reputational, or other harm if their protected 
health information falls into the wrong hands. 
Appendix B: Survey Instruments 
Whistle-blowing intention (Gundlach et al., 2003; Keil et al., 2010; Miceli & Near, 1984, 1985):  
1) I intend to report my supervisor’s actions with respect to the Privacy and Personal Information 
Protection Act (1998) to the management of my company. (1 = definitely not; 9 = definitely) 
2) I intend to report my supervisor’s actions with respect to the Privacy and Personal Information 
Protection Act (1998) to an external auditor. (1 = definitely not; 9 = definitely) 
3) I intend to tell an outside authority, such as the Department of Human Services, about my 
supervisor’s actions with respect to the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 
(1998). (1 = definitely not; 9 = definitely) 
Stability of wrongdoing (Gundlach et al., 2003; Keil et al., 2010; Weiner, 1985): 
1) The illegal mining of health records was part of an ongoing pattern of behavior. (1 = definitely 
not; 9 = definitely) 
Controllability of wrongdoing (Gundlach et al., 2003; Keil et al., 2010; Weiner, 1985): 
1) The supervisor could have controlled the illegal mining of health records. (1 = definitely not; 9 = 
definitely) 
Intentionality of wrongdoing (Gundlach et al., 2003; Keil et al., 2010; Weiner, 1985): 
1) The supervisor intentionally violated the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 
(1998). (1 = definitely not; 9 = definitely) 
Seriousness of wrongdoing (Gundlach et al., 2003; Keil et al., 2010; Miceli & Near, 1985, 1992): 
1) How serious is the potential harm to individuals from the violations of the Privacy and 
Personal Information Protection Act (1998)? (1 = not at all; 9 = very much) 
2) How much financial, reputational, or other harm could result from the use of protected health 
information for marketing purposes? (1 = not at all; 9 = very much) 
Anticipated regret about remaining silent (Keil et al., 2010; Wong, Yik, & Kwong, 2006; Zeelenberg et al., 
2000): 
1) If you decided to remain silent about your supervisor’s action and then later learned that an 
individual’s confidential health records about their depression and suicide attempts were used 
to send free samples of an antidepressant to their work address, which caused the employee 
to lose their job, to what extent would you regret your decision to remain silent? (1 = no regret; 
9 = very much regret) 
Fear of retaliation (Danis et al., 2008): 
1) I am worried that I may lose my job as a result of reporting unethical behaviors in the company. 
(1 = not at all; 9 = very much) 
2) I am worried that I will experience retaliation as a result of reporting the unethical behaviors of 
senior employees. (1 = not at all; 9 = very much) 
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